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Marino’s (2017a,b) review of what we know about the perceptual, affective, and cognitive 
capacities of the domestic chicken is presented with an ethical goal in mind: to change what she 
perceives as our current immoral treatment of chickens. Although the moral argument is merely 
implicit, Marino suggests that chickens, like humans, have moral standing; that is, they are the 
sort of thing one must consider when making moral decisions. The implicit argument goes 
something like this: 
 
1. Humans have moral standing because of our specific perceptual, affective, and cognitive 
capacities.  
2. Chickens have these capacities, at least to some extent.  
3. Therefore, chickens also have moral standing.  
 
Both premises of this argument have flaws. In order to see what a stronger argument for chicken 
moral standing would look like, let’s examine the two premises. In premise (1), the claim that 
perceptual capacities are relevant for moral standing has no precedent in any of our moral 
theories, and one would be hard-pressed to develop a plausible theory in which perceptual 
capacities had intrinsic moral value. Cognition is arguably relevant for moral standing, but it is 
widely thought that there is a boundary between perception and cognition such that the two are 
distinct sets of faculties. This distinction plays an important role in current vision science.  
Cognitive capacities are morally relevant on the basis of deontological moral theories (e.g., 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reasoning), and affective capacities are morally relevant on 
sentimentalist (e.g., David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) and utilitarian 
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(e.g., John Stewart Mill’s Utilitarianism) moral theories. Thus, we can modify premise (1) to read 
as follows: 
 
1.  Humans have moral standing given our affective and cognitive capacities. 
 
With this modification, the section titled “Visual Cognition” is largely irrelevant for drawing the 
moral conclusion, although the observation that chickens prefer biological motion in point light 
stimuli does suggest that sociality is salient for the species. 
 Premise (2) is overstated, implying that chickens have the morally relevant cognitive and 
affective capacities that humans tend to have. Yet it need not be overstated to draw a moral 
conclusion. Some of the cognitive capacities discussed are not clearly morally relevant. Other 
cognitive capacities are ascribed to chickens without sufficient evidence. Marino is right that more 
research on chickens is needed; we need more evidence in order to draw conclusions about some 
of the morally relevant properties. But we also need to be clear on what these capacities are; so 
more theoretical work is also needed. I have discussed most of these cognitive capacities in detail 
in The Animal Mind (Andrews 2012); below I will briefly examine the current state of the 
supporting evidence, given my understanding of each capacity. 
 The cognitive capacities of transitive inference and numerosity are not among those that 
are taken to be relevant for moral standing. Models of transitive reasoning in animals based on 
associative processes show how both human and nonhuman animals may be able to perform the 
sorts of transitive inference tasks given to species from fish to apes (De Lillio et al. 2001). 
Numerosity abilities like the ones discussed are found in human infants as well as in many 
nonhuman species, and they are widely considered to be based on a core cognitive process that 
remains in place for humans who begin to acquire counting and numerical abilities. The ability to 
keep track of five balls does not imply the existence of “a ‘mental number line’ indicative of 
ordinality” (Carey 2009, p. 131). Rather, such abilities can be explained in terms of a different kind 
of mental state: analog magnitudes (Beck 2012). The transitive inference and numerosity 
capacities of nonhuman animals are cognitive, but there is no evidence that they are conceptual; 
and they do not reflect the kind of cognition of interest to deontological, sentimentalist, or 
utilitarian moral theorists. 
 Self-control is a more promising capacity of interest for the deontological ethicist. 
Someone with true self control is able to make judgments of relative value and to refrain from 
automatic action in order to do the better thing. Does current research indicate that hens have 
this kind of self-control? The study cited indicates that hens will choose a 4-second longer delay 
for a much larger food reward. However, with a closer look at the study, it is apparent that the 
hens, who were food deprived, then trained and tested in an operant apparatus, learned to 
associate the larger reward with the relevant stimuli; in a forced-choice task, hens chose the larger 
reward, as would be expected. Time and food rewards are both salient variables, but the 
difference between the time delays is a fraction of the difference between the size of the food 
rewards. Self-control in apes is tested quite differently. Like the marshmallow task given to 
children, in which children are left alone with a marshmallow and told that they can eat it now, 
or wait, and eat two later, apes have to avoid eating the food in front of them to gain a larger 
reward later. Human children and apes alike will sometimes distract themselves from the tasty 
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treat in order to help them control their desire to eat it now. Nothing like that is apparent in the 
hen study.  
 Perspective-taking is a cognitive capacity that is also discussed in the context of moral 
status. Understanding what another sees, feels, wants, or believes is a key capacity for moral 
agency. It is less clear whether it is needed for mere moral standing. Human children only develop 
this capacity slowly, yet they are held to merit moral consideration long before they can engage 
in perspective-taking. This is a good thing for Marino’s goals, since the evidence she presents for 
perspective-taking in chickens fails to take into account the distinction between tactical and 
intentional deception (Byrne & Whiten 1988). Tactical deception involves "acts from the normal 
repertoire of the agent, deployed such that another individual is likely to misinterpret what the 
acts signify, to the advantage of the agent" (Byrne & Whiten 1991, p. 127).  Intentional deception, 
on the other hand, requires that the deceiver intends that the other has a false belief. Marino 
presents as evidence of perspective-taking the observation that subordinate males inhibit the 
vocal part of the tidbit-eating display when a dominant male is not otherwise distracted. However, 
given the criteria developed by Byrne & Whiten, this behavior would be categorized as an instance 
of tactical deception, which is rife across species, and, like the wing-dragging behavior of the 
piping plover who lures the predator from her nest, may be an ungeneralizable species-specific 
behavior. That said, the flexibility of chickens’ vocalizations more generally indicates a social 
awareness that may turn out to be more relevant morally than the capacity for perspective-taking. 
 Intentional deception requires one form of perspective-taking, empathy requires another. 
Empathy is usually distinguished from sympathy as requiring knowledge of how another feels, 
and feeling that same emotion with another person, whereas sympathy is an experience of 
concern for another. Empathic contagion, on the other hand, is not usually described as requiring 
perspective-taking capacity: We don’t think that infants who start crying because another infant 
starts crying understand what the other infant is feeling.  The study showing that hens’ physiology 
changed when their chicks were given an air puff, even though the air puff wasn’t aversive to the 
hens themselves, suggests to Marino that the hens could put themselves in the “shoes” of the 
chicks and realize how the air puff would feel to them, even when it didn’t feel like much to the 
hen herself. Hens who didn’t experience the air puff first didn’t display any heightened 
physiological response when observing an air puff directed at their chicks. Whereas one possibility 
is that the hens took the perspective of their chicks, another is that the hens learned about the 
air puffer (which is vaguely annoying) and their response was the same as it would be in response 
to any threat toward their chicks.  
 Although episodic memory is not a capacity traditionally invoked as grounds for according 
moral standing, it is often invoked as grounds for according the status of “person,” and persons 
have moral standing. Do we currently have evidence that chickens have episodic memory? Endel 
Tulving (2005), who coined the term, defines it as “The operations of episodic memory require, 
but go beyond, the semantic memory system.... The essence of episodic memory lies in the 
conjunction of three concepts—self, autonoetic awareness, and subjective time” (p. 9). Having 
episodic memory entails self-consciousness, then, and is part of a larger capacity of mental time 
travel, “sending” ideas of oneself into possible futures and back into the past. Chickens’ ability to 
match-to-sample indicates semantic memory, but it offers no evidence for mental time travel in 
the way Tulving describes. 
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 Whereas there is currently no compelling evidence of episodic memory, perspective-
taking, sense of self, self-control, deductive reasoning, or true numerical ability in chickens, there 
is evidence of memory, prediction, communication, associative reasoning, and numerosity. The 
same is true of many humans (e.g., children) who lack the former set but have the latter yet still 
enjoy moral standing. None of the former set of cognitive capacities is morally irrelevant, but they 
are not going to be required for moral standing by any moral theory that takes human infants to 
be eligible for moral standing in their own right. 
 Affective capacities are more clearly relevant when it comes to arguing for moral standing 
for organisms like human infants and nonhuman animals. This is of primary import for utilitarian 
and sentimentalist moral theories. Fortunately for Marino’s overarching goal, the current 
evidence we have for the affective capacities of chickens is more compelling. If we focus on 
chicken communication (and the relationship between communication and emotional responses 
to social structures and perhaps even norms), physiological responsiveness to harm directed at 
oneself and others, variable attention paid to other individuals depending on their role in the 
community, preferences, emotions, individual differences and personality, we have a more 
promising set of capacities relevant for moral standing. These capacities suggest that chickens 
have desires. 
 Any sentient creatures who can communicate their desires to us thereby make some kind 
of a moral claim on us. Even if we do not act to fulfill their desires, we take up a moral obligation 
not to impede their desires without some good reason. As Hume (2010) put it, “Would any man, 
who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as 
on the hard flint and pavement?” 
 The mere fact that chickens cannot communicate their desires to us does not negate the 
fact that they have them. With continuing research on the content of their desires, we can come 
to learn what those desires are.  
 If it is sufficient for moral standing that one values what happens to oneself — that is, that 
one has goals and corresponding desires to fulfill them — then chickens also have moral standing. 
The revised, more plausible version of Marino’s implicit argument goes like this:  
1. Anyone who values what happens to them has moral standing.  
2. Chickens value what happens to them. 
3. Therefore, chickens have moral standing.  
The argument is more plausible than the one we started with, but the premises do require 
defense. It requires conceptual and theoretical work defending the criteria for moral standing. 
And it requires empirical research on chickens to determine what they value. Marino has shown 
us that there is much research that can be done with chickens. And she rightly suggests that we 
have a moral obligation to learn what they have to teach us. 
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